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A B S T R A C T
The Arctic is frequently framed as a region of disaster and conflict, as well as of opportunity and cooperation.
Disaster diplomacy is one approach for examining how dealing with disasters might or might not affect conflict
and cooperation, yet little work on Arctic disaster diplomacy has been completed, especially regarding specific
bilateral relations. This paper contributes to filling in this gap by focusing on the post-USSR era to provide the
first examination of the prospects and relevance of Norway-Russia disaster-related interaction for the Svalbard
archipelago. As a discussion paper focusing on one case study, Norway-Russia disaster diplomacy is analysed in
the context of Svalbard followed by potential prospects for Norway-Russia relations to be influenced by
Svalbard’s disaster-related activities. Possible meanings for Norway-Russia relations are then discussed. No in-
dication is found that disaster-related activities for or around Svalbard are influencing or could influence
Norway-Russia relations or that disaster-related activities are nudging or could push the diplomacy in new and
lasting directions. As such, this Arctic case study supports the current disaster diplomacy conclusions that dis-
aster-related activities are sometimes used to spur on existing processes, but have not yet shown to produce any
different directions in conflict or cooperation.
1. Introduction
The Arctic is varyingly framed as a region of disaster, conflict, co-
operation, and diplomacy (Jensen, 2016; Pincus and Ali, 2016;
Sellheim et al., 2019; Wilson Rowe, 2018; Young, 1992). Rightly or
wrongly, Russia is sometimes highlighted (e.g. Wither, 2018;
Zimmerman, 2018) as the most challenging Arctic country with which
to cooperate regarding safety, dangers, threats, conflicts, and disasters.
Norway-Russia interaction is particularly poignant given that the
countries’ border represents the only Arctic land boundary between
NATO (or ‘the West’) and Russia (see also Laruelle, 2014; Wilson Rowe,
2018). These two countries also share an internationally unique re-
lationship regarding the archipelago of Svalbard. Svalbard is sovereign
Norwegian territory, but is governed by the Svalbard Treaty (1920)
which gives extensive living and working rights to citizens of signatory
countries (originally 14 in 1920, rising to 46 currently). This situation
means that the territory remains outside the Schengen Agreement and
the European Economic Area, despite Norway’s membership in both.
The governance of Svalbard could potentially complicate disaster-
related activities for and around the archipelago, which has continually
experienced numerous safety challenges.
This paper focuses on the post-USSR era to examine the prospects
and relevance of Norway-Russia disaster-related interaction for
Svalbard, providing a discussion paper focusing on one case study
within a specific timeframe. As such, pre-1991 incidents are not cov-
ered, such as the crash of a Soviet military airplane in 1978 (Pedersen,
2009). The rest of this section describes the disaster diplomacy ap-
proach followed by Section 2 explaining the current state and future
potential of Norway-Russia interaction for disaster-related activities in
and around Svalbard. Section 3 analyses possible meanings for Norway-
Russia relations, leading to the conclusion that starting from a top-
down Oslo-Moscow perspective of Norway-Russia relations does not
suffice for presenting the full story of Norway-Russia disaster diplomacy
for Svalbard.
Disaster diplomacy is one approach for examining cross-border
disaster-related activities. It examines one aspect of disaster-politics
interactions: how disaster-related activities (meaning disaster risk re-
duction (DRR), disaster response, and disaster recovery) do and do not
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impact diplomatic collaboration (Kelman, 2012, 2016). Theoretical and
empirical disaster diplomacy work so far has not substantiated the
claim of new, lasting diplomacy based on disaster-related activities,
even though short-term diplomatic interactions have sometimes been
observed. Instead, pre- and post-disaster activities are frequently used
as one excuse among many to pursue pre-desired diplomatic pathways,
whether for rapprochement or for conflict, leading to short-term in-
fluence from disaster-related factors which is inevitably superseded by
non-disaster related factors (Kelman, 2012, 2016).
Much disaster diplomacy research has focused on violent conflict or
countries deemed to be ‘enemies’. Key examples are Greece-Turkey
from the 1950s to the 2000s (Ker-Lindsay, 2007); Cuba-USA when Fidel
Castro led Cuba (Glantz, 2000); climate change not likely influencing
sub-Saharan wars (Buhaug, 2010; Webersik, 2010); and the 26 De-
cember 2004 earthquake and tsunami supporting (but not creating) a
peace deal in Aceh (Indonesia) and conflict escalation in Sri Lanka
(Kelman, 2012). Disaster diplomacy has been less engaged with non-
violent political disputes and disagreements. Holloway (2000), how-
ever, analysed how southern African countries collaborated from 1991
to 1993 to avoid a drought emergency from becoming a disaster at the
same time as the regional wars and South African apartheid were
ending. The few, detailed disaster diplomacy case studies not involving
environmental hazards include poisoning from contaminated cooking
oil in Morocco in 1959 (Segalla, 2012) and pollution-induced haze
around Southeast Asia (Brauer and Hisham-Hashim, 1998; Islam et al.,
2016). Meanwhile, disaster diplomacy work has dabbled in situations
where non-sovereign territories officially conduct diplomatic interac-
tions, known as para-diplomacy, proto-diplomacy, or micro-diplomacy
(e.g. Bartmann, 2006; Duchacek et al., 1988).
The Arctic combines many of these issues. A growing body of lit-
erature on international cooperation on disaster-related activities for
the Arctic (e.g. Kämpf and Haley, 2014; Sellheim et al., 2019; Sydnes
et al., 2017) still leaves little research on Arctic disaster diplomacy.
Kontar et al. (2018) examines Arctic disaster diplomacy through sci-
ence, while Grydehøj (2014) looks at informal diplomacy for Svalbard
with some application to disaster- and risk-related activities. Pincus and
Ali (2016) explore many topics linked to aspects of disasters and cross-
border interactions around the Arctic while Nikitina (2017) covers
possibilities and challenges for Arctic regional cooperation and DRR.
Few studies have picked specific bilateral relations for Arctic disaster
diplomacy, as Kontar (2018) does for Russia and the USA, indicating
the importance of the Norway-Russia case study selected here.
2. Disaster-related activities and Svalbard for Norway and Russia
2.1. Norway-Russia interests for Svalbard
Since the end of the Cold War, and with climate change effects
manifesting, the Arctic has increasingly attracted the interest and
concern of global parties (Jensen and Hønneland, 2015; Brady, 2017)
including for Svalbard (Grydehøj, 2014). The region has always been
subject to a gamut of hazards—such as storms, coastal and inland
flooding, landslides and avalanches, earthquakes, meteorite strikes, and
now climate change-related effects such as melting sea ice, sea-level
rise, and melting permafrost—with expanding activities, traffic, people,
and infrastructure are tending to increase disaster risks (Kämpf and
Haley, 2014; AMAP, 2017). Within the changing Arctic environment
and growing disaster risks, fears are expressed regarding disputes and
conflicts as well as the emergence of opportunities for cooperation
(Kontar et al., 2018; Mileski et al., 2018; Pincus and Ali, 2016).
These issues have gained particular prominence with respect to
Norway-Russia relations (Grydehøj et al., 2012). The two countries
have long stressed the significance of their Arctic regions with their
official national and foreign policy discourses now intensifying the
importance they attach to the Arctic (Government of Russia, 2008;
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 2017; Medby, 2014). Both
countries’ perceptions of the Arctic and of themselves as Arctic players;
their historic and recent involvement in the Arctic; their interest in
Svalbard; and their conglomerations of political, cultural, and economic
interests, all feed into the complexities of Norway-Russia connections
(Jensen and Skedsmo, 2010; Hønneland, 2016).
Against the background of continual Arctic environmental and so-
cial changes, some analysts express fears regarding possible hostile
directions of Russia’s Arctic strategy and, thus, of the relationship be-
tween Russia (the only non-NATO littoral Arctic country) and Norway
(Overland and Krivorotov, 2015). These concerns have been ex-
acerbated by Russia’s unilateral actions, re-militarisation, and military
activities in the Arctic, such as bomber flights along NATO’s Arctic
coasts, which are perceived as gauging Western solidarity and response
(Laruelle, 2014). Nevertheless, a long-term diplomatic freeze with
Russia regarding the Arctic seems unlikely (Åtland and Pedersen, 2008;
Young, 2019) especially given those who argue that Russia perceives
that its own interests would be best served through bilateral and mul-
tilateral agreements, favouring cooperation over conflict and competi-
tion (Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud, 2014; Nikitina, 2018). In fact,
longstanding and largely successful bilateral Arctic cooperation be-
tween Norway and Russia covers fisheries, environmental management,
search-and-rescue (SAR), and oil spill preparedness and response. Re-
cent examples are the Barents Sea Treaty (2010) and Russia’s role in the
Arctic Council’s legally binding agreements on SAR (Arctic Council,
2011), oil-spill response (Arctic Council, 2013), and scientific co-
operation (Arctic Council, 2017). To paraphrase Staun (2017, 314),
while Russia has been “breaking the rules of the game” in Ukraine, it
has followed the “rules of the game” in the Arctic. Irrespective, tension
remains, mostly due to balancing international cooperation and na-
tional sovereignty (Wilson Rowe and Blakkisrud, 2014, 66). Perceptions
remain of ex-Soviet Russia contrasting with Norway being Western (e.g.
Jensen, 2017), leading to differences on many Arctic issues including
expected spheres of influence and navigational rights (Farré et al.,
2014, Solski, 2013). Vast differences in viewpoints are assumed to exist
given the different political backgrounds of Norway and Russia as well
as different interpretations of balancing each one’s international and
national concerns.
Svalbard epitomises this situation. Norway through its sovereignty
and Russia through the Svalbard Treaty (1920) are the only states to
maintain a continuous, historic presence on the archipelago. Russia acts
partially through a proxy, the coal mining company Trust Arktikugol,
with a presence in three locations: Barentsburg with limited mining,
Grumant, and Pyramiden, with the latter two no longer involving active
mining. Trust Arktikugol was established in 1931 and then changed
from a coal mining enterprise into a state monopoly and the main
managing company coordinating Russia’s Svalbard activities. It plays
the largest role in supporting social infrastructure and logistics for
Barentsburg, Pyramiden, and Grumant. All Russian federal budget
subsidies for supporting Svalbard activities are consolidated though
Trust Arktikugol, including federal budget allocations for the latest
Russian research program on Svalbard (Government of Russia, 2017).
Russia’s intention in maintaining Barentsburg, Pyramiden, and Gru-
mant is assumed to be for rights and access to (potential) resources,
and, ultimately, its use of the Arctic as an important outpost projecting
its national prestige and position as a world power (Overland and
Krivorotov, 2015; Wither, 2018; Zimmerman, 2018). Similarly, Sval-
bard features high on Norway’s Arctic agenda with Oslo seeking to
reinforce the archipelago’s strategic and geopolitical importance
(Government of Norway, 2015-2016; Grydehøj, 2014). Thus, Svalbard
remains subject to carefully crafted political dialogue and calculations
between Norway and Russia, with potential influences on disaster-re-
lated activities.
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2.2. Norway-Russia disaster-related cooperation and interactions for
Svalbard
Svalbard must deal with a range of risks, vulnerabilities, and po-
tential hazards, covering DRR, disaster response, and disaster recovery.
Some incidents and activities are not necessarily directly linked to
Russia or Russians, such as the avalanches on 19 December 2015
(Longyearbyen) and 19 May 2019 (Kamkrona) which each killed two
people. Many others are directly about activities involving Norwegian
as well as Russian citizens, authorities, and first responders on and
around Svalbard (Table 1). For example, the 2017 snowmobile incident
in which a Russian guide was killed involved the Russian tour company
Grumant Arctic Travel operated by Trust Arktikugol, but Norwegian
authorities dealt with the incident including fining the company under
Norwegian law (Governor of Svalbard, 2019). The Kursk sinking and
Akademik Lomonosov transport are Table 1′s instances which are most
distant from Svalbard, illustrating how Barents Sea waters are used,
meaning that Svalbard must consider the potential for similar, nearer
events.
Table 1 illustrates the variety and complexity of disaster-related
activities linking Norway and Russia for and around Svalbard. Other
experiences and examples range from individual considerations such as
snowmobile safety (Mehus et al., 2011) and polar bear encounters
(Gjertz et al., 1993) through to community-wide ones such as tsunamis
(Berndt et al., 2009) and chemical contamination (Banks et al., 2002).
Increasing industrial and recreational activities on Svalbard (Governor
of Svalbard, 2018) are expected to increase risks while climate change
is rapidly altering some hazards (Hanssen-Bauer et al., 2019). Given
this diversity, the archipelago’s self-reliance is essential. The next point
of assistance, i.e. receiving emergency resources from mainland
Norway (or even Russia or Greenland), is often too far away to be of
immediate use, particularly given that weather and sea conditions can
render external assistance infeasible for days. This situation highlights
the need for local cooperation and pooling of resources.
Norway-Russia disaster-related cooperation on Svalbard-relevant
matters such as SAR and oil spill response has existed for decades (e.g.
Sydnes and Sydnes, 2013). Respective examples are the 1995 Norwe-
gian-Russian SAR regime (Sydnes et al., 2017) and the 1994 oil spill
bilateral regime (Sydnes and Sydnes, 2019). Such agreements are acted
upon through joint training and exercises, involving, among others,
Russian and Norwegian emergency management agencies, rescue cen-
tres, and coast guards. Meanwhile, cooperative DRR is indicated
through both countries signing the Polar Code for shipping (IMO, 2017)
which seeks to ensure safe and productive sea routes despite the social
and environmental changes around the region (Hildebrand et al.,
2018). Along these lines, Svalbard’s population—including Russians
and Norwegians—has become increasingly involved in disaster-related
efforts across sectors, such as science, tourism, and pollution manage-
ment.
In 2016 with support from Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
University Centre in Svalbard (UNIS) based in Longyearbyen set up the
Arctic Safety Centre for teaching, research, and application of safety
measures around the Arctic to improve disaster-related activities. Staff
include Norwegians, Russians, and other nationalities. The mandate is
focused on science and training for everyone, rather than science di-
plomacy or safety diplomacy per se, but research topics range from ice,
ocean, and atmospheric physics to the tourism industry and pollution
monitoring. The same holds for the research town of Ny-Ålesund, an
international research station operated by Kings Bay AS, a company
owned by the Government of Norway. Scientists collaborate across
nationalities, including some disaster-related research, but little sug-
gestion of science diplomacy exists beyond conducting research.
Meanwhile, the tourism boom continues for Svalbard, both in the
number of visitors and the number of operators (Holmgaard et al.,
2019). This growth has led to a greater variety of tour operators and
tourists, both in terms of nationality (e.g. the Russian company Gru-
mant Arctic Travel, established in 2014), their Arctic experience, and
the products and services they provide or seek. All operators are subject
to Norwegian law regardless of nationality and several of them run trips
to or near the Russian settlements. They have become acutely aware of
the hazards to which their tours are subject, such as rock slides, ava-
lanches, storms, ice conditions, and polar bears. Operators commu-
nicate among themselves both informally (e.g. through local Facebook
groups and specialised WhatsApp groups) and through meetings fa-
cilitated by the Governor of Svalbard to discuss new regulations,
changing risks, measures to be taken, and experiences. There is a sense
that tour operators will assist each other when needed, irrespective of
nationality, yet information exchange and coordination has tended to
be more frequent among the longer-established Norwegian-run tour
operators, due to their vast experience of Svalbard and already existing
connections.
Regarding pollution as a disaster (e.g. Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015),
mutual assistance efforts have been driven by a team developing ‘Pro-
ject Isfjorden’ (Miljødirektoratet et al., 2018), now in its third year,
which has collected and removed several tons of plastic waste from
Svalbard’s shores. ‘Voluntourism’ initiatives by some ship tourism op-
erators, such as ‘Clean Up Svalbard’ (AECO, 2014) which is now in
effect, combine tours with cleaning up trash around Svalbard. Co-
operation, joint training, and exchange to prevent and deal with pol-
lution from research stations around Svalbard also occurs (Tummon
and Schneider, 2019). These initiatives are specifically to counter pol-
lution, rather than being for diplomacy, and anyone can be involved
regardless of nationality or origin, provided they can get to Svalbard. In
fact, Russia’s initial concerns about the Svalbard Environmental Pro-
tection Act (Government of Norway, 2001) and subsequent acceptance
of it (Åtland and Pedersen, 2008) displayed no lasting impact on
Norway-Russia diplomacy.
Despite this wide variety of disaster-related activities and the
Table 1
Examples of Norway-Russia disaster-related interactions around or near Svalbard.
Event Date Place Casualties Sources
Airplane crash on land 27/03/1991 Mimerbukta, Pyramiden 2 killed 1 injured AIBN (1991)
Airplane crash into a mountain 29/08/1996 Operafjellet 141 killed Olaisen et al. (1997)
Mine explosion 18/09/1997 Barentsburg 23 killed Miljøverndepartementet (1999)
Submarine sinking (Kursk) 12/08/2000 Barents Sea 118 killed Amundsen et al. (1999)
Helicopter crash 30/03/2008 Heerodden, Barentsburg 3 killed 6 injured AIBN (2013)
Tourists in dinghies hit by ice 21/08/2012 Ymerbukten Bay, Isfjord 1 killed 1 injured AIBN (2014)
Ship crewmember fell overboard 26/11/2015 Sentralbanken 1 killed AIBN (2017)
Tourist snowmobilers broke through the ice 27/04/2017 Tempelfjorden 1 killed 7 injured Governor of Svalbard (2019)
Injured ship crewmember evacuated by helicopter and died 12/07/2017 Barents Sea 1 killed AIBN (2018a)
Helicopter crash 26/10/2017 Isfjord near Barentsburg 8 killed AIBN (2018b)
Moving a floating nuclear power plant (Akademik Lomonosov) 04/2018 The entire Norwegian coast None Lenton (2018)
Ship crashed into the dock (Aurora Explorer) 15/07/2018 Barentsburg dozens of injuries AIBN (2019)
Pollution Ongoing Svalbard Not known Banks et al. (2002) and Pouch et al. (2017)
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Norwegian-Russian cooperation in many instances at different levels,
none of the reports, citations, or documents indicate impact on Norway-
Russia relations. Instead, the links are confined principally to on-the-
ground, typically operational disaster-related activities without in-
dications that disaster diplomacy is occurring.
2.3. Potential Norway-Russia disaster diplomacy for Svalbard
Many possibilities remain for Norway-Russia disaster-related co-
operation for and around Svalbard which provide potential for disaster
diplomacy, even though little seems to be happening thus far. Concerns
about terrorism or sabotage are expressed, though the risk is considered
to be very low (Governor of Svalbard, 2016), while war and violent
conflict would not currently be expected between Norway and Russia,
despite threats at times (Åtland and Pedersen, 2008). Weapons-related
violence in Svalbard is very rare even with the proliferation of guns and
knives. The first and so far only armed bank robbery in Longyearbyen’s
history was by a Russian citizen on 21 December 2018 who was quickly
apprehended, tried, and sentenced by Norwegian authorities with
limited Russian involvement.
As a non-violent example, in April and May 2019, the pilots of one
of the commercial airline companies serving Svalbard went on strike for
one week, severely curtailing the movement of people and goods, in-
cluding bringing food to the archipelago. In a longer strike, what would
have been the prospects for Moscow to offer to fly in supplies, irre-
spective of the Government of Norway’s response? Similarly, with
power outages or water supply disruptions, plans exist for evacuating
the population (Longyearbyen Local Government, 2017), leading to
questions about the possible response from Moscow, especially for the
Russian settlements but presumably in collaboration with the Govern-
ment of Norway.
Svalbard also had to manage reduced air travel when the Icelandic
volcano Eyjafjallajökull erupted, stopping much air travel across
Europe from 15 to 22 April 2010 and for shorter periods in May 2010.
Continuing in the realm of environmental hazards, avalanches and
other snow hazards (Eckerstorfer and Christiansen, 2011), rockslides
and other slides (Hartvich et al., 2017), tsunamis (Berndt et al., 2009),
the Haakon Mosby Mud Volcano (Vogt et al., 1997), meteorite strikes
(Gudlaugsson, 1993), and solar flares (i.e. space weather; Simmons and
Henriksen, 1988) yield possibilities for cooperation. Until now, the
pattern has been for local actions to dominate, as it should for all dis-
aster-related activities when feasible (Lewis, 1999; Wisner et al., 2004),
which means local Norwegian authorities leading, followed by escala-
tion to Norwegian authorities beyond Svalbard when local actions do
not suffice. That is, Svalbard being a part of Norway prioritises Nor-
wegian responses, with limited scope for other governments to assist. In
the Russian settlements, anyone local is prioritised for disaster-related
action, but within the context of oversight and support from the local
Norwegian authorities—which is how the Svalbard Treaty (1920) is
meant to operate. For instance, irrespective of Russian laws on DRR and
disaster response (Government of Russia, 1994), all settlements on
Barentsburg must adhere to Norwegian laws (Government of Norway,
1925, 2001).
Russia is manoeuvring to make use of the Northeast Passage (or
Northern Sea Route) as a shipping route through its waters between the
Atlantic and Pacific, despite viability challenges including shallowness
and lack of ports (Farré et al., 2014). Asserting sovereignty over these
waters is not new to Russia or the USSR (Pharand, 1968). Not all such
routes necessarily hug the Norwegian shoreline and skirt Murmansk.
Depending on ice, storms, and waves around the Arctic Ocean, routes
might go north by Greenland and pass by Svalbard (see also Nyman
et al., 2020). Joint Norwegian-Russian monitoring of vessels would help
for DRR and overlapping responses might be necessary in case of pro-
blems. Such a cooperative monitoring approach is already in force for
parts of the Barents Sea near the coast from Lofoten to Murmansk (IMO,
2012), although is not truly joint since Norway is responsible for the
Norwegian coastline and Russia is responsible for the Russian coastline.
Norway has been developing a vision of establishing Svalbard as a re-
gional servicing and SAR hub which would then be available to ships
using Svalbard as a conduit to and from parts of the Northeast Passage
or elsewhere. As an analogue, on 18 December 2007, as part of mutual
aid along the Russia-Norway land border, a Norwegian rescue heli-
copter crossed into Russia to save twelve crew from the Viktor Koryakin
which had foundered on the Rybachiy Peninsula (Marchenko et al.,
2015).
In parallel, a longstanding discussion exists about establishing a
Russian SAR base at Barentsburg, which the October 2017 helicopter
crash (Table 1) brought to the forefront through Russian and Norwe-
gian authorities publicly expressing their disagreement on the matter
(Staalesen 2017). Logistically, ensuring emergency access of Russian
SAR vessels to Svalbard territorial waters is not straightforward, as it
would require permission from Norway, which would be done ac-
cording to the existing bilateral and Arctic Council SAR agreements
(Sydnes et al., 2017). Time could be lost in doing so, without some form
of pre-approval, which Norway is unlikely to support given that
Norway tends to prefer retaining control of Svalbard’s SAR activities.
Instead, dialogue has been moving towards cooperative responses and
joint SAR actions. For example, Trust Arktikugol’s SAR team consists of
seventeen professionals contracted and permanently based in Bare-
ntsburg who have already been involved in training exercises and
emergency actions jointly with Norwegian emergency services
(Shepelev, 2015). Norway could consider more use of Trust Arktiku-
gol’s SAR team along with existing resources and technical capacity in
Barentsburg (Chernakova, 2019).
Russia continues to use nuclear vessels in the Barents Sea and wider
area, as shown by Kursk and Akademik Lomonosov (Table 1). Even if
they remain officially outside of Svalbard’s territorial waters, unofficial
incursions would always be a possibility (and similarly with nuclear
vessels from NATO and other countries) while any broken nuclear
vessel could drift towards Svalbard. The need for and activities covering
Norway-Russia cooperation on radiation incidents is openly discussed
in the media (Nilsen, 2019), further highlighting how non-Russian
nuclear vessels are part of the Svalbard disaster equation (see also
Heininen and Segerståhl, 2002).
Nuclear or radiation disasters could link to health diplomacy and
medical diplomacy for disasters, as could epidemics and pandemics.
Quarantine in a small settlement such as Longyearbyen or Barentsburg
has the advantages of the town being isolated with air and sea trans-
portation easily controlled, but has the disadvantage of 100% of the
population potentially being rapidly exposed to a pollutant or pa-
thogen. Cruise ships are known venues for outbreaks (Fisher et al.,
2018) and some of them carry more passengers than the population of
Longyearbyen and Barentsburg combined. If a large cruise ship with an
epidemic on board seeks to dock at Svalbard for supplies and treatment,
the settlements would not likely be able to cope without outside as-
sistance, so an option exists for Russia or other Svalbard Treaty signa-
tories to offer aid to Norway. Solid foundations of research for health
diplomacy and medical diplomacy exist (e.g. Aginam, 2003, Iglehart,
2004) including directly related to disaster diplomacy (e.g. Whittaker
et al., 2018), providing a baseline for planning.
3. Discussion: Meanings for Norway-Russia relations
Section 2, and wider disaster diplomacy theory (Kelman, 2012,
2016), explains how disaster-related cooperation emerges in various
forms. For disaster-related Norway-Russia relations around Svalbard,
formal interactions can be multilateral (e.g. the Arctic Council and the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council) and bilateral (e.g. the Norwegian-Russian
Nuclear Commission, the Joint Norwegian-Russian Environment Com-
mission, the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, and the
Norwegian-Russian Energy Dialogue). As well, government officials
interact at the local level, such as in May 2019 when Norwegian health
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authority members visited a newly equipped Barentsburg hospital to
strengthen direct contacts between Barentsburg and Longyearbyen’s
health centres, including undertaking joint responses in case of emer-
gencies. The Governor of Svalbard has bimonthly contact meetings with
Russia’s Consulate General in Barentsburg while the Governor’s office is
represented one day per month in Barentsburg, to offer contact with the
local population (Governor of Svalbard, 2018). With the Governor of
Svalbard, Grumant Arctic Travel was involved in the joint Norwegian-
Russian emergency and safety training in 2018.
These formal and official connections are important for improved
disaster-related activities, but are not leading to other forms of
Norwegian-Russian diplomacy. The narrative of a hostile Russia versus
NATO in the Arctic (e.g. Wither, 2018; Zimmerman, 2018) does not
assist in creating these connections or breeding trust. Yet it could be
that Russia, Norway, or both do not especially want such connections or
trust. In April 2016, Norway and Russia tussled over using Long-
yearbyen airport to transport Russian military personnel and equipment
to and from Barneo, a private Russian camp near the North Pole. Then,
NATO held a meeting in Longyearbyen in May 2017, raising Russia’s
hackles.
Other factors inhibiting Norway-Russia relations for disaster-related
activities on Svalbard are the distances, terrain, and limited transpor-
tation between the settlements, so special effort is needed to continually
organise and participate in joint events and interactions. Keeping in
mind the increasing prevalence of electronic meetings and media, other
disaster diplomacy case studies have analysed this propinquity factor.
They show that propinquity has little impact on formal disaster di-
plomacy (Kelman, 2012), but it can influence individuals at all levels
who use neighbourliness to push their own disaster diplomacy agenda
(s) (e.g. Ker-Lindsay, 2007 for Greece-Turkey).
Consequently, barriers to propinquity can impede informal contacts
which would develop one-on-one trust and individual-to-individual
exchange. Residents from all nationalities on Svalbard and across the
settlements often try to connect via specifically established social media
groups, cultural and sporting events, and in-person meetings. Over
time, they typically lead to information and skills exchange regarding
disasters, such as snow conditions, equipment availability, and SAR.
Individuals connect on behalf of their businesses, to help each other, to
provide ideas, and especially within the tourism industry, to ensure that
safety needs are fulfilled. Scepticism remains regarding the compat-
ibility of Norwegian and Russian risk perceptions, safety standards,
resources, training, and procedures. Another inhibiting factor in in-
formal connections is the personnel turnover. In both the Norwegian
and Russian settlements, most of the population is employed on fixed-
term contracts lasting 2–4 years. In Longyearbyen, the average length
of stay for residents is about four years, complicating informal di-
plomacy, since developing and maintaining mutual trust takes time and
is typically about specific individuals. Those who remain longer typi-
cally have stronger informal links.
Among all these inhibitors, one form of formal and informal inter-
action is scientists from Norway, Russia, and other countries con-
tinually collaborating on disaster research and its application for
Svalbard. It is rarely expressed as science diplomacy (cf. Kontar et al.,
2018), instead being to produce the best possible science (e.g.
Marchenko et al., 2015; Sydnes and Sydnes, 2013, 2019). Collaborating
scientists do not even represent their countries or nationalities, instead
tending to represent themselves and their institutions. That is, a Russian
scientist living and working in Norway at a Norwegian institution (or
elsewhere) would not necessarily have any authority, interest, or
credibility in representing Russia or the Government of Russia—in the
same way that a Norwegian scientist living and working in Norway at a
Norwegian institution (or elsewhere) would not necessarily have any
authority, interest, or credibility in representing Norway or the Gov-
ernment of Norway. Consequently, Russians and Norwegians colla-
boratively researching cannot be assumed inevitably to be science di-
plomacy, let alone disaster diplomacy.
Nonetheless, no matter how much interpersonal interaction occurs
between individuals in and interested in Svalbard, closer and more
formal interactions on disaster-related activities could be inhibited by
Norway and Russia each fearing infringement on sovereignty in and
access to Svalbard (as shown by the discussions over establishing a
Russian SAR base at Barentsburg). With more countries being actively
involved in Svalbard, the concerns of Norway and Russia also extend
beyond each other. Protecting their own national interests in the con-
text of all Norway-Russia relations seems to impede official disaster
diplomacy efforts. Each country implies hesitancy in accepting Svalbard
as an international space for cooperation (for instance, such as
Antarctica) beyond what is stated explicitly in the Svalbard Treaty
(1920). This common interest of avoiding Svalbard as too much of an
international space does not bring Norway and Russia closer together.
Norway effectively adopts the stance that Russia and other countries
should not aim for disaster diplomacy, because Norway as the archi-
pelago’s governing state must lead and control any disaster-related
work, especially disaster response. One example of this point is the set-
up of Norway’s two Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCC), with the
JRCC of Northern Norway based in Bodø and stating its responsibility
as being from 65˚N to the North Pole including Svalbard
(Hovedredningssentralen, 2019). Roberts and Paglia (2016) and
Misund (2017) describe a similar point for science on Svalbard, scut-
tling thoughts of science diplomacy (e.g. Kontar et al., 2018), because
science is used to keep Svalbard within the Norwegian fold.
Meanwhile, Russia feels just as entitled, seeking to exercise its treaty
rights as much as possible. In 2012, the new national strategy of the
Russian presence on Svalbard was introduced (Government of Russia,
2012) and the road map for its realisation had been enacted in 2015,
shifting strategic foci (see Government of Russia, 2016). Although
Russia still conducts limited coal mining around Barentsburg, the main
national interest and priority is research, since Svalbard is regarded by
Russia as a unique site for advancing Arctic science. In 2014, Russia’s
science centre and permanent Arctic expedition was established with
research facilities in Barentsburg and Pyramiden and with a detailed
conceptual and research programme (Government of Russia, 2014),
some of which relates to DRR such as on climate change and tourism
risk management. Coordinated by the Arctic and Antarctic Research
Institute in St. Petersburg, the work covers multiple disciplines from
glaciology to history, but, as with Norway (Misund, 2017), the science
is used to legitimise Russia’s presence (Roberts and Paglia, 2016).
Overall, disaster-related activities for Svalbard display few deep
meanings for Norway-Russia relations, apart from using disaster-related
activities as one approach among many for asserting each country’s pre-
conceived rights to the archipelago. Cooperative research, education,
training, and action continue, but without indications that it sub-
stantively influences diplomacy, such as pushing it in new or lasting
directions. As such, this case study supports the current disaster di-
plomacy conclusions (Kelman, 2012, 2016) that disaster-related activ-
ities are sometimes used to spur on existing processes and support
short-term diplomacy, but tend not to produce different directions in
international relations.
4. Conclusions
This paper contributes to filling in the literature’s gap of examining
bilateral disaster diplomacy in the Arctic by examining the prospects
and relevance for Norway-Russia disaster-related interaction for and
around Svalbard during the post-USSR time period. Operational ex-
amples were presented along with discussion of how Norway and
Russia are interacting for Svalbard’s disaster-related activities, yet
without apparent influence on their relations. Overall, no indications
could found that disaster-related activities for or around Svalbard are
definitely influencing or could fundamentally influence Norway-Russia
diplomacy.
These conclusions need to be considered within this paper’s
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limitations. First, the paper started out and focused on formal and of-
ficial instances of disaster-related activities for Svalbard, emulating
how much disaster diplomacy work (e.g. Kelman, 2012, 2016) has
proceeded. As emerged from the material and discussion, plenty is
happening beyond official diplomacy—including beyond para-di-
plomacy, proto-diplomacy, and micro-diplomacy—at the individual,
organisational, and local levels, whereby people use their own skills,
networks, contacts, and interests to work with people whom they wish
to. Sometimes, these activities involve government workers in their
official capacities, such as civil servants or scientists, but not always. A
deeper understanding of these informal, usually person-to-person, in-
teractions for disaster-related activities would add depth and breadth to
disaster diplomacy. Similarly, the analysis here lacks historical depth.
1991 is an understandable starting point to analyse the present day, due
to the step change which occurred with the USSR’s collapse. Never-
theless, many current Svalbard-relevant structures, institutions, and
attitudes emerged from the Cold War and might even lead farther back
in time. Could the main beginning for Svalbard disaster diplomacy be
the ramping up of polar exploration and rescues in the late nineteenth
century or even the archipelago’s use as a hunting base starting in the
seventeenth century?
Irrespective, the material and interpretation so far for Norway-
Russia and Svalbard reaffirm prior disaster diplomacy conclusions that
disaster-related activities do not create new or lasting diplomacy. In
line with all previous disaster diplomacy case studies, non-disaster
factors—namely baseline politics and multi-scalar geopolitics—seem to
be more important than disaster-related activities. The lack of apparent
disaster diplomacy, however, does not directly inhibit cooperative DRR,
disaster response, or disaster recovery operationally. Indirect effects,
such as information or resources withheld from Svalbard by Oslo or
Moscow alongside possible distrust among specific players, require
further investigation, along with the possibilities for continuing to im-
prove collaboration, especially for pre-disaster activities.
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